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A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism
Sungjoon Cho*
I. INTRODUCTION: SURREAL PHENOMENA
Suppose that a consortium of wealthy and powerful local industries,
acting through lawmakers captured by these industries, managed to pass a
statute, damaging to the larger public welfare, purely for a protectionist
purpose. Suppose further that this statute victimizes exports from a small,
poor country such as Vietnam, to a large, rich country such as the United
States, because these imported products are cheaper and thus pose a
competitive threat to rival domestic industries. Suppose also that courts in
the importing country can do little to stop this chain of events. Rational
individuals might find these events objectionable, if not inconceivable. Yet,
no matter how irrational such events may appear, they constitute a very real
problem in the United States. This Article argues that such parochial
protectionism, which might seem to be the normal state of affairs to public
choice theorists,1 yields catastrophic effects in domestic constitutional as
well as foreign policy terms. Moreover, these harmful effects extend not
only to the United States but also to the rest of the world.
The post-Cold War detente between the United States and Vietnam led
quite naturally to the lifting of a long-standing trade embargo and the
subsequent launching of a historic bilateral trade agreement. In the course
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, S.J.D. (Harvard, 2002). I thank Professor Joseph Weiler, Dean William Alford,
and Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter for their support and inspiration. I am grateful to Matthew
Christensen for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am also very much indebted to
enlightening feedback from many participants of the Harvard Law School East Asian Legal
Studies Lunchtime Talk held in October 2004. Shannon John, Danielle Mathey, Steven
McFarlane, and staff at the Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
provided excellent editorial assistance. All errors, of course, are mine.
'"Public choice" theorists basically contend that politicians tend to serve their own
interest, rather than broader public interest. See Leon Felkins, Introduction to Public Choice
Theory, Nov. 8, 2001, at http://www.magnolia.net/l-eonf/sd/pub-choice.html. See JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
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of this "normalization" process, 2 the United States delivered its usual
sermons on the value of free trade and advised Vietnam to take advantage
of its natural endowments by harvesting seafood such as catfish.3 In fact,
the United States' counsel was judicious in view of the fertility of the
Mekong River Delta, as well as the low cost of labor in Vietnam. In short,
Vietnam enjoys a competitive advantage in aquaculture vis-d-vis its trading
partners such as the United States, which naturally became a lucrative
market for Vietnamese seafood exports.
When the bilateral trade agreement was signed, an influx of cheap
Vietnamese catfish had begun to affect the domestic market share of
southern catfish farmers, who were already not competitive due to natural
disasters,4 lack of innovation,5 and, most critically, questionable policy
guidance from the Department of Agriculture.6 Alarmed by their sinking
profits, the southern catfish lobbies mobilized local politicians and launched
a vigorous campaign against Vietnamese catfish . Initially, this reflexive
and defensive response tended to revolve around reactionary and
xenophobic arguments. Some propaganda warned that Vietnamese catfish
have "grown up flapping around in Third World rivers and dining on
whatever they can get their fins on." 8 Other lobbies alleged that the catfish
might contain traces of Agent Orange from the Vietnamese War.9 Before
long, however, the southern catfish lobbies realized that they needed to
marshal more powerful political clout in order to achieve sufficient
protection.
Fortunately for the southern seafood lobbies, and unfortunately for the
rest of the nation, the machinery of American democracy proved quite
adaptable to this task. In rapid and secretive fashion, the Congress,
captured by the domestic catfish lobby, passed a flatly protectionist statute
2 See Mark E. Manyin, The Vietnam-U.S. Normalization Process, CRS Issue Brief for
Congress (Nov. 28, 2003), at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 27534.pdf.
3 Harvesting Poverty: The Great Catfish War, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2003, at A18
[hereinafter Harvesting Poverty].
4 Catfish Sector to Appeal U.S. Ruling, VIET NAM NEWS (VNS), Aug. 14, 2003, at
http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2003-08/13/Stories/17.htm [hereinafter VNS, Catfish].
5 See Amalia R. Walton, Catfish Wars: Vietnam's Fight for Free Trade in the U.S.
International Court of Justice, 13 PAC. RIM L. & PO'Y J. 471, 481-82 (2004).
6 See Elizabeth Becker, Delta Farmers Want Copyright on Catfish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2002, at Al.
7 Four southern states, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana, produce around
ninety six percent of U.S. catfish. See Kerrilee E. Kobbeman, Hook, Line and Sinker: How
Congress Swallowed the Domestic Catfish Industry's Narrow Definition of This Ubiquitous
Bottomfeeder, 57 ARK. L. REv. 407, 411 (2004).
8 Press Release, U.S. Senator John McCain (Arizona), Catfish Import Barrier Puts
International Trade Agreements at Risk (Dec. 18, 2001), at http://mccain.senate.gov/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content id=279[hereinafter McCain]
9 Harvesting Poverty, supra note 3 (citing the former Senator Marion Berry).
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"without debate or a vote."' This statute, lacking any scientific basis,
legalized a monopoly over the use of the "catfish" label for domestic
species, while banning such use for Vietnamese species. Moreover, the
Commerce Department, in cooperation with the International Trade
Commission, imposed heavy anti-dumping duties on Vietnamese catfish
through a discriminatory non-market economy (NME) channel in a
wholesale denial of Vietnam's competitive advantage on seafood. This
advantage is both unacquired, due to cheap labor and natural endowments
befitting catfish harvest, and acquired, due to investment and innovation.
The barrage against Vietnamese aquacultural industries also affected
Vietnamese shrimp exports in similar ways as heavy antidumping duties
were imposed on them as well.
This recent case of parochial protectionism aimed at Vietnam's
seafood exports has spawned pernicious consequences both domestically
and internationally. Domestically, they are the latest empirical
confirmation of Madisonian constitutional failure: the federal government
was mobilized to benefit narrowly defined special interest groups, i.e., the
southern catfish and shrimp lobbies, at the expense of an enormous welfare
loss to nationally defined consumers and consuming industries.'
Internationally, such a naked display of protectionism has alienated a new
ally with which the United States had only recently signed a bilateral trade
agreement in good faith. Considering the devastating impact on the
Vietnamese economy inflicted by this type of protectionism, it should not
be surprising that the recent U.S. trade policy against Vietnamese seafood
has been characterized as "another Vietnamese War."' 2 Furthermore, from
the broader perspective of the multilateral trading system represented by the
World Trade Organization (WTO),13 this case has been referred to as the
"purest manifestation of the hypocrisy of American trade policy. 14
Against the backdrop of this counter-productive outcome, this Article
10 McCain, supra note 8.
" American Seafood Distribution Association, U.S. Broke Basa Commitment, VASEP
Claims, June 30, 2003, at http://www.freetradeinseafood.org/news/article0l.htm [hereinafter
Basa Commitment].
12 "[M]ore than 20 years after their failure during the Vietnam war, they opt to launch a
new war, as they declare, not to fight communism, but to combat Vietnamese tra and basa
catfish." Vietnamese Embassy in the United States, Catfish Campaign against Vietnamese
Fish (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/
newsitem.php3?datestamp=20011114174243 [hereinafter Catfish Campaign].
13 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]; LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 6,
6-18, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144-53 (1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND].
14 Paul Blustein, Free Trade's Muddy Waters, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at F1 (quoting
David J. Rothkopf, a Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce in the Clinton Administration).
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argues that the type of parochial protectionism revealed in the recent
Vietnamese seafood trade skirmishes does a grave disservice both to the
United States and to the international community. Not only are such
measures inefficient, they are also ineffective. The Article consists of four
Parts. Part I documents in greater detail the trade dispute over Vietnamese
catfish and shrimp exports to the U.S. market, with special attention to the
question of how powerful southern lobbies prevailed over the broader
economic interests of consuming industries and consumers. Part II explores
the roles played by all three governmental branches-direct as well as
indirect, actual as well as potential-in facilitating and enabling this
distortion of free trade principles. Part III addresses the devastating effects,
both internal and external, of this kind of protectionism; namely, that such
measures result in a dual catastrophe in the sense that they serve parochial
interests at enormous expense to the United States and the global economy
(i.e., "constitutional failure"), while gravely damaging the reputation of the
United States abroad (i.e., "foreign affairs failure"). To avoid similar
catastrophes in the future, Part IV suggests that the United States must
achieve greater legislative and procedural transparency both domestically
and internationally, through a more inclusive policy-making process and a
stronger commitment to multilateralism. Finally, the Article concludes by
arguing that the United States must play a more authentic leadership role in
the international community, rather than resorting to the dead-end of
Exceptionalism.
II. A SEAFOOD NATION: THE VIETNAMESE CATFISH AND
SHRIMP SAGA
Beginning in 1994 when the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam was
lifted and the seafood tariff reduced to zero, U.S. imports of Vietnamese
catfish increased dramatically. 15  Before long, these imports began to
threaten southern catfish farmers' long-standing monopoly in supplying
catfish to domestic consumers. 16 The reaction was full and fierce. Senator
Marion Berry went so far as to allege that the Vietnamese catfish might
contain Agent Orange sprayed during the Vietnamese War. 17  This
15 See Adam S. Rix, The Mekong River Basin: A Resource at the Cross-Roads of
Sustainable Development, 21 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 103, 117 (2003) (observing
continuing investment by the Vietnamese government in aquaculture).
16 See Ranja Sengupta, U.S.-Vietnam Trade War over Seafood: Free-Trade Not So Free
After All, International Development Economics Associates, Sept. 4, 2003, available at
http://www.networkideas.org/themes/trade/sep2003/tp04_Catfish.htm; MARK E. MANYIN,
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE VIETNAM-U.S. BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT at 22, last
updated on Sept. 9, 2002, available at http://usembassy.state.gov/vietnam/
wwwfbtacrsrpt.pdf (last visited on Nov. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Manyin, Bilateral Trade
Agreement].
17 Catfish Campaign, supra note 12.
318.
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allegation provoked scathing criticism both inside and outside the United
States. In fact, the safety of the Vietnamese catfish was confirmed and even
praised by experts and U.S. government officials on several occasions. 18
Undeterred, the Association of Catfish Farmers of America (CFA) lobbied
congressmen from catfish raising states such as Mississippi and Louisiana
in February 2001 in a futile attempt to persuade the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick to support protective measures. 19
In September 2001, senators from southern states attempted without success
to block the passage of the Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement over
the catfish issue.2°
The southern catfish lobbies' first success came from the Congress
nearly simultaneously with the launch of the bilateral trade agreement.
Without any scientific justification, Congress passed a law which basically
stipulated that only southern catfish could be marketed under the "catfish"
label.21 Accordingly, Vietnamese catfish producers were forced to use
other labels such as "tra" or "basa." Through this bizarre labeling scheme,
the southern catfish lobbies sought to recover lost market share by
essentially misleading consumers.
Even as Congress aided southern catfish farmers, the Executive branch
launched an even more direct and destructive assault on Vietnamese catfish.
On June 28, 2002, the CFA and other southern catfish industries filed a
petition for an antidumping investigation with respect to Vietnamese catfish
imports.22 On August 9, 2002, the International Trade Commission (ITC)
made a preliminary determination that Vietnamese catfish imports
materially injured domestic catfish industries. This was followed on
January 24, 2003 by a preliminary determination by the Department of
Commerce (DOC) that Vietnamese catfish producers/exporters were, in
fact, guilty of dumping.23 On June 16, 2003, in its final dumping
determination, the DOC found dumping margins ranging from 36.84% to
63.88%. This finding was followed by the ITC's final injury determination
on July 31, 2003.24 The DOC then issued its antidumping order to the
Customs Office on August 7, 2003 based on its calculation of weighted-
average dumping margins existing for the period October 1, 2001 through
18 Id.; McCain, supra note 8; Harvesting Poverty, supra note 3.
19 Catfish Campaign, supra note 12.
20 Id.; Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 415.
21 See infra Sec. II.A.
22 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (ITA), Fact Sheet:
Final Determination in the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Frozen Fish Fillets
from Vietnam, available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/0603/
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March 30, 2002.25
Following the same pattern, an antidumping attack was also launched
against Vietnamese shrimp imports. As in the case of catfish, the opening
of the U.S. shrimp market to Vietnamese producers allowed American
consumers to enjoy food that was once considered haute cuisine at
affordable prices. Indeed, shrimp prices decreased from $3 to $1.85 per
pound during the period between 2001 and 2003.26 Meanwhile, U.S.
shrimp imports rose sevenfold during the period between 1998 and 2002,
and continue to rise.27  In response, the U.S. Shrimp Trade Action
Committee, acting on behalf of the U.S. Southern Shrimp Alliance (SSA),
filed a demand for an anti-dumping investigation with the DOC on
December 31, 2003.28 On July 6, 2004, the DOC announced its preliminary
determination with respect to antidumping duty investigations on imports of
certain frozen and canned warm-water shrimp from China and Vietnam.29
In its preliminary determination, the DOC slapped antidumping duties of up
to 93.13% on shipments from Vietnam and up to 112.81% for China.3 ° On
or about November 24, 2004, the DOC will make its final determination
after considering comments submitted by interested parties. 31 If the DOC
finds in its final determination that Vietnamese or Chinese exporters are
guilty of dumping, the ITC will make its final injury determination on or
32about January 8, 2005, triggering the collection of antidumping duties by
the Customs Office.33
III. THREE GOVERNMENT BRANCHES' PROTECTIONIST
INVOLVEMENT
A. The Congress
Following their futile attempt to sabotage the bilateral trade pact with
25 id.
26 Consumers for World Trade, U.S. Shrimp Smell Fishy (Oct. 15, 2003), at
http://www.cwt.org/news/Articles/October%/202003/Shrimp.htm [hereinafter Smell Fishy].
27 Vietnam Protests U.S. Shrimp Dumping Duties, REUTERS (July 7, 2004), available at
http://in.news.yahoo.com/040707/137/2ettb.html [hereinafter Vietnam Protests].
28 Tran Dinh Thanh Lam, Trade-Vietnam: Shrimp Dumping Charge by U.S. Smells of
Catfish, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=22539 [hereinafter Smells of Catfish].
29 ITA, Fact Sheet: Preliminary Determinations in the Antidumping Duty Investigations
on Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from the People 's Republic of China and
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, at http://www.ita.doc.gov/mediaiFactSheet/
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Vietnam, the southern catfish lobbies moved toward erecting an artificial
trade barrier against Vietnamese catfish imports. Their basic strategy was
to classify Vietnamese imports as something other than catfish, and thus
discourage potential consumers from choosing imported Vietnamese catfish
over domestic catfish products. There were no scientific or other reasons to
justify such a move. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had
originally permitted Vietnamese producers to use labels such as "basa
catfish" on the ground that these labels performed a basic function of
conveying to consumers certain important information on product
characteristics.34  The highly technical, taxonomical argument that
Vietnamese catfish belong to a different family from their American
counterpart did not alter the fact that the former is also a variety of catfish.
The FDA, in collaboration with the National Marine Fisheries Services
(NMFS), rejected this distinction.35 Upon request by the FDA, Dr. Carl J.
Ferraris, a catfish expert, testified that there was no justification,
"historically or scientifically," for limiting the term catfish to North
American catfish.36 The American Fisheries Society (AFS) also supported
this position by noting that catfish represents more than 2,400 species of
fishes in the "Siluriformes" order scattered all over the world, regardless of
differentfamilies, which are a narrower taxonomical category than order.37
Notwithstanding these findings, the southern catfish industries
continued to lobby furiously against the inclusive "basa catfish" label
permitted by the FDA. The gist of their self-serving argument was that the
term "catfish," as it relates to the marketing of catfish products, was not a
taxonomical reference to a certain order of fish, but rather a commercial
term reserved exclusively for "American" catfish produced in the United
38States. To treat Vietnamese catfish as "catfish," they alleged, would
either be fraudulent39 or tantamount to "economic adulteration. 'AO The
southern catfish farmers claimed that it was Vietnamese producers who
misled consumers by imitating the well-established brands of the former,
such as "Cajun Delight" or "Delta Fresh," and thus perpetuated the
mistaken impression that such catfish originated in the Mississippi River
34 See Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 412.
" See id. at 425
36 Becker, supra note 6.
37 See Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 425-26; Joseph S. Nelson, et al., When is a Catfish Not
a Catfish - U.S. Legislation over a Name, 27 FISHERIES 38, 39-40 (2002), available at
http://www.fisheries.org/html/fisheries/F0202/F0202p38-40.PDF. The authors contend that
the FDA's authority to assign market names to fish should be protected and not trumped by
legislation. Id. at 40.
38 See Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 412.
39 Id. at 415-16.
40 Id. at 413 (quoting Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama).
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Delta when they were actually harvested in the Mekong River Delta.41
This argument does not constitute a valid justification for a
protectionist labeling scheme. Indeed, if southern catfish farmers want a
more exclusive label for their own catfish, they could use the term "channel
catfish," rather than mere "catfish," to reflect the precise origin and
42species. Alternatively, the southern catfish farmers could adopt a
voluntary labeling scheme, such as "American catfish" or "Mississippi
Delta catfish." If concerns about mischaracterization of imported catfish
persisted, remedies could be sought through other domestic U.S. statutes,
such as trademark43 or consumer protection.4
Disregarding all these reasonable alternatives, a handful of southern
Congressmen have managed to pass a purely protectionist statute designed
to grant domestic catfish producers a monopoly over the use of the "catfish"
label.4 5  The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRIA)
amended Section 403 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 46 to the
effect that a food shall be deemed to be misbranded "[i]f it purports to be or
is represented as catfish, unless it is fish classified within the family
Ictaluridae.',47  Furthermore, the Senate stealthily passed a separate bill
prohibiting, with the same protectionist intent as the FSRIA, the FDA from
spending money on the licensing of imports of catfish from families other
than Ictaluridae. This measure effectively banned the importation of
Vietnamese catfish from the Pangasius family as "catfish. ''48 This bizarre
piece of legislation, which converts a generic appellation to a proper one,
was only possible thanks to an eccentric legislative practice called a "rider."
A rider is a legislative provision which cannot pass on its own merits but
which is nonetheless attached to a separate, unrelated important bill, such as
an appropriations bill, and thus rides unchecked throughout the legislative
41 Id. at 422-23.
42 Nelson et al., supra note 37, at 39-40.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002).
44 See Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 436-38 (arguing for the implementation of the
"Country of Origin Labeling Act" to better inform consumers of origins of catfish they
consume).
45 See Michael Woods, Food for Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati Rice,
13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 123, 142-43 (2002).
46 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(t) (2002).
47 See Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 416; Catfish Campaign, supra note 12; Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10806, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
48 Catfish Campaign, supra note 12; Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-176, 115
Stat. 704, § 755 (2001) ("None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this
Act to the Food and Drug Administration shall be used to allow admission of fish or fish
products labeled wholly or in part as 'catfish' unless the products are taxonomically from the
family Ictaluridae.").
Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism
25:315 (2005)
process. 49 This form of legislative abuse enables bad policies to become the
law of the land because it can "force passage., 50  Although a group of
Senators tried unsuccessfully to sever the protectionist language from the
underlying legislation, they did manage to shine a spotlight on the
hypocrisy of United States trade policy in this area. 51
Ironically, this amendment and subsequent new FDA guidelines on
catfish labeling 52 violate a basic tenet of the organic statute, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, in that they effectively prevent the
disclosure of critical information-the fact that basa or tra are still
"catfish"-to consumers. In other words, the amendment fails to "properly
label" foods, which is the very mission of the FDA. 53  Indeed, the
misconception on the part of consumers that basa or tra are not substitutes
for American catfish appears to be what the southern catfish industries
actually intended.54  The spread of such misinformation certainly
contradicts the central purpose of U.S. consumer protection laws and
regulations: providing consumers with better information with respect to
potential purchases. It is noteworthy that even though many different
families of sardines exist, these fish are all marketed in the United States
under the name "sardines," among other names, due to the general
requirement that labels should not be misleading.55
From an international trade law perspective, a labeling scheme that
changes a generic category to a proper noun in order to protect domestic
industries is a violation of the national treatment principle. 6  Article 2,
Paragraph 3 of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement stipulates that,
"[e]ach Party shall accord to products originating in the territory of the
other Party treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like domestic
products in respect of all laws, regulations and other requirements affecting
49 Project Vote Smart, Government 101: How a Bill Becomes Law, at http://www.vote-
smart.org/resourcegovtl01_02.php#riders (last visited Aug. 15, 2004).
50 Adam Smith, Partisan 'Riders' Hold Good Legislation (June 11, 1997), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/wa09smith/9706 11 op.html.
5I McCain, supra note 8; Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 419.
52 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration - Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition,
Letter to Various Seafood Trade Associations Regarding the Labeling of Catfish (Feb. 28,
2003), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-fi-f/slcf2003.html.
13 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(A) (2004).
54 "The position of the politicians from the catfish producing states was that the
Vietnamese were illegally appropriating the hard won and expensively cultivated cachet of
the word 'catfish' to sell their imported, phony and subversive product as if it were as
wholesome and patriotic as our stuff." Russ John, Catfish: A Southern Cultural Icon, at
http://users.aristotle.net/-russjohn/commerce/ctfsh.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
55 Panel Report, European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231iR
(May, 29 2002); WT/DS23 I/R/Corr.1 5.60 (June 10, 2002).
56 McCain, supra note 8.
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their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution,
storage or use."57
Here, under the catfish labeling scheme (a law affecting their internal
sale), Vietnamese catfish (products originating in the territory of the other
Party) cannot be marketed as "catfish" (treatment no less favorable)
different from domestic catfish (like domestic products). In fact, this type
of trade barrier has frequently been struck down in other cases. For
instance, the European Court of Justice condemned Italy's attempt to
reserve, on an exclusive basis, the generic word for vinegar ("aceto" in
Italian) for its traditional, wine-based domestic product. Accordingly, non
wine-based foreign vinegars could not be marketed in Italy as "vinegar."
The ECJ concluded that the Italian measure violated the fundamental
principle of free movement of goods within the European Community. 8
Apart from its own flaws, the foregoing legislative protectionism
caused yet another complication. The catfish labeling statute put the U.S.
government in an awkward position when it attempted to challenge a
similar regulation enacted by the European Union. An E.U. Regulation
banned the use of the term "sardines" as a generic name and permitted such
use exclusively for those species found along the European coast.59 This
protectionist legislation monopolized, in a regulatory sense, the commercial
label "sardines" for European sardines and discriminated, in a practical
sense, against other species of sardines imported from Peru. Under pressure
from the traditional Maine herring industry, the USTR originally planned to
join Peru in its protest. 60 However, it was subsequently forced to abort that
plan, to the consternation of American herring exporters, as a result of the
catfish labeling legislation.6' The incoherence in this policy, and forced
inattentiveness to other trading partners' similar violations, are additional
prices to be paid for contingent protection such as the catfish labeling.
57 Agreement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam on Trade Relations, art. 2, 3, available at http://usembassy.state.gov/vietnam/
wwwhbta.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (emphasis added).
58 Case 193/80, Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3019; Case 281/83, Commission v.
Italy, 1985 E.C.R. 3397.
59 Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R, 3-4 (Sept. 26, 2002).
60 Communication from the United States Requesting to Join Consultations on European
Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/4 (May 8, 2001).
61 Becker, supra note 6; McCain, supra note 8. See also Desa Philadelphia, Catfish by
Any Other Name, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/global/
feb2002/articles/catfish.html (reporting that "Congress's catfish vote forced the U.S. trade
representative to drop opposition to a similar ban in Europe that allows only North Atlantic
sardines to be sold as sardines").
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B. The Executive
1. Anti-Dumping Measures: Built-In Protectionism under the Guise of
Fairness
To grapple with the implications of antidumping actions against
Vietnamese catfish and shrimp exports, a basic examination of the concept
of "dumping" is in order. Dumping is, in essence, an international mode of
"price-discrimination" by which a producer exports its product cheaper than
it is sold domestically, sometimes even below its production cost.
62
Although this economically sensible and legitimate approach to profit
maximization happens everywhere, as is often seen with factory outlets and
airline tickets, the term "dumping" carries a pejorative connotation relative
to a more value-neutral term like "price discrimination." Price
discrimination, at least domestically, is penalized only when it rises to the
level of 'predatory' pricing, which unfairly suffocates competition in order
to drive out competitors.63 Nonetheless, major countries regularly condemn
dumping as unfair and react by imposing heavy duties. In the absence of
predatory intent on an international scale-which is a practical
impossibility in most cases considering that exporters tend to be small
businesses in developing countries64-this phenomenon can hardly be
explained without invoking protectionism. In fact, most antidumping
measures are triggered by the existence of claims of injury to a narrow
scope of domestic industries that produce "like products" in competition
with foreign producers. In 1970, Kenneth Dam declared that "the concern
with dumping is therefore a concern with the protection of domestic
industry from international competition., 65 More recently, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan reaffirmed this position by stating that
antidumping suits are "just simple guises for inhibiting competition"
imposed in the name of "fair trade.
66
Yet, these remedial actions are based on a self-righteous rhetoric of
62 See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND POLICY 141-45 (5th ed. 2000).
63 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(2004).
64 It seems absurd to apply the so-called "recoupment test," which aims to determine
whether predatory producers intend to raise prices to recoup the loss after they drive out
rivals from the market via dumping, to small producers from poor countries. See Jorge
Miranda, Should Antidumping Laws Be Dumped?, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 255, 270
(1996).
65 KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
168 (1970).
66 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 725 (2000) (quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan,
Remarks Before the Dallas Ambassadors Forum, Dallas, Texas (Apr. 16, 1999)).
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fairness that overwhelms rational notions of efficiency. 67 The alleged
rationale of antidumping laws is the notion of a level playing field, under
68which producers are given identical conditions for production. No matter
how appealing this abstract argument may be to ordinary people, the truth is
that trade makes sense because trading partners are not identical, but are
different in many ways, including levels of development and natural
endowment. These differences, in fact, are the sources of comparative
advantage. 69 As long as trade is the goal, low prices should not be penalized
unless they result from illegal activities, such as predatory pricing or
copyright violation, or result in injury sufficiently serious as to trigger
safeguard measures. Among economists, there is broad consensus that
dumping is a benign phenomenon provided it is not accompanied by
predatory intent.70  This view is based on various economically sound
reasons, including profit maximization and the launching of products into
new markets. The sale of tickets at deeply discounted fares by airline
companies is but one example of this benign form of dumping.
Returning to the Vietnamese catfish dispute, we see that Vietnamese
farm-raised catfish are cheaper yet better quality than those caught in the
Mississippi Delta. Natural endowments of cheap labor and superior
technology in Vietnam provide that country with an advantage over those of
the U.S., where production costs are much higher.71 Vietnam's Mekong
Delta features perfect natural conditions for farming catfish. For one thing,
the river's fast current is said to yield better-tasting catfish than those
caught in the Mississippi Delta.72 Additionally, Vietnam is still a poor
country where the average wage is very low and where labor tends to be
family-driven. On top of these natural advantages, Vietnam also possesses
an acquired advantage in the form of an innovative catfish breeding
technology through which Vietnamese farmers are able to "bring the farm
67 BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE DEVILISH DETAILS
OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW xi (2003).
68 On its official website, the Commerce Department, in the name of "Ensuring a Level
Playing Field," instructs how to file antidumping claims. See http://www.commerce.gov/
field.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). See also WTO Negotiating Group on Rules,
Communication from the United States: Basic Concepts and Principles of the Trade Remedy
Rules, TN/RL/W/27, at 4 (Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter The U.S. Communication].
69 See Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Antidumping and Market Disruption:
The Incentive Effects of Antidumping Laws, in THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM:
ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 155, 160-65 (Robert M. Stem ed., 1993) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS].
70 See Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in ANALYSIS AND
OPTIONS, supra note 69, at 135; Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L.&ECON. 1, 11 (1995).
71 Shalmali Guttal, The Mississippi-Mekong Catfish Wars, at
http://www.peoplesfoodsovereignty.org/new/docs/doc9.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
72 Id.
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to the fish" by "raising their catfish fingerlings in cages submerged under
houseboats."7  This new technology has enabled higher and better
production. In sum, Vietnamese catfish are more competitive than
Mississippi catfish because the former are not only cheaper, but also
cleaner and tastier75 than the latter.
As with Vietnamese catfish, the cheaper price and better quality of
Vietnamese shrimp are a natural consequence of cheap labor and an
innovative breeding technology.76 In particular, the Vietnamese farm
shrimp in ponds, while their American counterparts catch shrimp in the
sea. 77  In stark contrast to advanced Vietnamese aquaculture, southern
shrimpers have stubbornly maintained their "Cajun traditions" and failed to
modernize their outdated open-water shrimp harvest.78  Accordingly, the
Vietnamese shrimp harvest is much more efficient and stable.
Nevertheless, Vietnamese aquaculture was deprived of it competitive
advantages by the protectionist measures described above. After "leveling
the playing field" through the statute monopolizing the use of the "catfish"
label,79 the U.S. government actually tilted the playing field toward
domestic catfish farmers by imposing antidumping duties on Vietnamese
catfish. The imposition of antidumping duties in this case is deeply
inequitable in view of the fact that it is the U.S. farmers, not their
Vietnamese counterparts, who receive government subsidies.80 Moreover,
in August 2003 the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced a $34
million compensation package to the domestic catfish industry based on
findings that their economic woes were caused by "natural disasters" that
preceded the alleged Vietnamese catfish dumping. 81 This announcement
indicates that the alleged injuries to domestic producers resulted from
73 Walton, supra note 5, at 480.
74 Catfish Campaign, supra note 12.
75 Experts say that:
Vietnamese catfish - even if not called catfish anymore in the United States - is popular in
North America not only because of its price, but more importantly, because of its taste.
According to North American seafood importers, catfish from Vietnam has a special flavour
and colouring, and is lean. The strong flow of the Mekong River makes the fish significantly
fresher, cleaner and tastier than fish that are raised in stable still ponds.
Guttal, supra note 71.
76 Vietnam Protests, supra note 27. See also Tran Dinh Thanh Lam, U.S. Shrimp
Dumping Charge Is Small Fish, ASIA TIMES ON LINE (Feb. 26, 2004), at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/FB26Ae1 .html.
77 id.
78 Smell Fishy, supra note 26.
79 Basa Commitment, supra note 11.
80 Guttal, supra note 71.
81 VNS, Catfish, supra note 4.
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causes completely unrelated to Vietnamese trading practices. Hence, the
antidumping duties imposed on Vietnamese exporters rested on a false
foundation.
To better understand the antidumping statute's protectionist effects,
one must take a close look at how the mechanism really works. Obviously,
it is the antidumping statute itself that structures and executes these
discriminatory remedies. Yet, if the antidumping statute is the main engine
powering the protectionist machine, it is the total discretion bestowed upon
and exercised by antidumping authorities-in particular, the DOC-that
actually operates the machine. Any antidumping determination is rife with
countless technicalities and formulae that sound innocuous, and even
scientific, at first glance. They are handled with great deference in the
name of professionalism. Yet, many of those technicalities and formulae,
the "devilish details" 82 so to speak, are based on pseudo-science. Indeed, it
was argued above that antidumping measures have no viable rationale, save
protectionism. Consequently, the antidumping statute creates a
bureaucratic and self-justifying system that is highly vulnerable to
protectionist capture. In short, the DOC "can come up with any dang
number [it] want[s] to."
83
Consider the following illustration of this arbitrary use of discretion.
When imposing antidumping duties on Vietnamese catfish, the DOC
departed from its traditional method of calculating normal value by
considering, as a factor for producing frozen catfish fillets, the whole fish
itself rather than primary factors such as labor, energy, feed, and
fingerlings.84 This aberrant practice, which the Court of International Trade
had already declared "deviant" in a similar case,85 resulted in inflated
dumping margins. This result is not surprising when one considers that the
use of an intermediary production factor, such as a whole fish, naturally
results in a higher normal value than would be obtained through the use of
primary production factors such as those underlying Vietnam's comparative
advantages. The DOC's aberrant practice also raises certain procedural
questions. Throughout the investigation, the DOC failed to notify the
Vietnamese respondents of the new calculation method, despite the fact that
82 See LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 67.
83 Blustein, supra note 14 (quoting Brink Lindsey of the Cato Institute).
84 See Walton, supra note 5, at 487-88. See also An Giang Agric. & Food Imp. Co. v.
United States, No. 03-00563 slip op. at 1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 8, 2004).
85 See Walton, supra note 5, at 493-94. See also Anshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. United
States, No. 02-00088 slip op. at 6 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 16, 2003), available at
http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/slipop/slipop03/Slip-Op%2003-83.pdf. The Court ruled that,
"[i]n valuing Plaintiffs' intermediate inputs, Commerce deviated from its well-established
practice of assigning surrogate values to the factors of production for those intermediate
inputs without providing an adequate explanation for such deviation." Id.
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it could reasonably be expected to be detrimental to their defense. 6
Unaware of the existence of the DOC's aberrant methodology, the
Vietnamese respondents relied upon the traditional methodology
"established by statute, case law, and practice. 's  Clearly, the DOC's
failure of notification is at odds with general principles of administrative
law such as fairness and due process.
88
Another dubious exercise of discretion by the DOC can also be found
in the Vietnamese shrimp case. In this case, however, foreign shrimpers
were incommoded by a taxing requirement that they calculate their U.S.
market prices based on a fictional reverse-engineering of the original
production process. On March 8, 2004, the DOC issued a rule requiring
that shrimp exporters establish an imaginary "headless, shell-on" shrimp
and adjust their actual prices and costs to this fictional creation, which may
be labeled "Frankenshrimp. ''89 Unfortunately, the DOC failed to provide
any guidance as to how to do this or any justification as to why actual prices
and costs should be disregarded.90 To create a Frankenshrimp under the
DOC's instructions, a Vietnamese shrimper would, theoretically, be
required to replace the vein, shell and tail of every shrimp already
processed, and then fabricate the cost most suitable to this fictional
creature. 91 The absurd "reverse-engineering" required under the DOC rule,
which was allegedly devised by lawyers representing domestic shrimp
industries, results in inflated dumping margins by keeping U.S. sales
artificially low by subtracting expost certain processing costs, such as those
for de-veining, peeling the shell and removing the tail, that contribute to the
actual price of shrimps sold in the United States.92 Yet, resistance to the
DOC rule would be futile because the DOC would condemn such resistance
by foreign producers or exporters as "lack of cooperation" and penalize it
by imposing "punitively high" dumping margins.93
2. Over-The-Top Protection: Non-Market Economy
The U.S. antidumping statute harms Vietnam further by discriminating
against it vis-a-vis other antidumping targets. The rationale for this special
discrimination is based on the assumption that data and information
86 See Walton, supra note 5, at 495-96.
87 Id. at 501.
88 Id. at 496.
89 Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, Shrimp Task Force, Meet the
Commerce Department's "Frankenshrimp, " available at http://www.citac.info/shrimp/
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collected in non-market economies (NMEs) like Vietnam are unreliable
because of the lack of a market mechanism. Accordingly, the U.S.
government justifies the use of a "surrogate" market economy from which it
derives whatever prices it deems to represent fair market values. As a
practical result of this approach, the U.S. government ends up playing a
God-like role in deciding the fate of foreign producers from NMEs. In the
Vietnamese catfish case, for example, the DOC unilaterally concluded,
without any consultation or reference to any relevant international
organization such as the IMF, that:
[T]he level of government intervention in the economy is still such that
prices and costs are not a meaningful measure of value. The Vietnamese
currency, the dong, is not fully convertible, with significant restrictions
on its use, transfer, and exchange rate. Foreign direct investment is
encouraged, but the government still seeks to direct and control it
through regulation. Likewise, although prices have been liberalized for
the most part, the Government Pricing Committee continues to maintain
discretionary control over prices in sectors that extend beyond those
typically viewed as natural monopolies. Privatization of SOEs and the
state-dominated banking sector has been slow, thereby excluding the
private sector from access to resources and insulating the state sector
from competition. Finally, private land ownership is not allowed and the
government is not initiating a land privatization program.
94
First of all, it seems quite beside the point for the U.S. government to
conduct such a comprehensive, yet still superficial, analysis on the general
economic standing of Vietnam in the course of a case-specific antidumping
investigation. After all, every antidumping case concerns a unique
transaction that deserves an individualized treatment. Even under its own
premise for the antidumping statute, the DOC would only have to focus on
the narrow matter of whether the Vietnamese government, via unfair
intervention, had distorted the price mechanism concerning production,
distribution or exportation of frozen catfish fillets. Instead, the DOC
resorted to the cumbersome and unreliable approach of examining a specific
transaction through the prism of its own broad but uni-dimensional analysis
of the current state of Vietnamese economic development. At a deeper
level, the DOC must first provide a cogent rationale for the oversimplified
dichotomy between market and non-market economies that underlies its
basic approach.95 Too many "unexamined assumptions," including those
94 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING DUTY INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN
FROZEN FISH FILLETS FROM THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM - DETERMINATION OF
MARKET ECONOMY STATUS, Public Document A-552-801 at 2, available at
http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/download/vietnam-nme-status/vietnam-market-status-
determination.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Market Economy Memorandum].
9' William P. Alford, When Is China Paraguay?: An Examination of the Application of
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related to the role of market and state in one economy, inform this
dichotomy.96 In addition, these assumptions tend to be one-sided and self-
serving. Consider, for example, the many regulations and restrictions on
the price mechanism in the titular market mechanism, such as rent control,
anti-trust and quotas.97 In fact, this unfavorable treatment of Vietnam in the
name of NME contradicts the U.S. government's own assessment of the
"fair" status of the Vietnamese market economy. The U.S. Embassy in
Vietnam, which may be in the best position to evaluate the economic
standing of Vietnam, concluded after its own rigorous assessment that
Vietnamese catfish were not subsidized by the Vietnamese government.
98
The next problem is the replacement mechanism under which
"Vietnam became Bangladesh."99  After condemning as unreliable the
entire Vietnamese price mechanism, the DOC disregarded actual data on
home market prices and production costs in Vietnam and substituted for
them fictional prices and costs borrowed from certain "surrogate" countries,
such as Bangladesh, that the DOC selected solely on the questionable
ground that such surrogate country shares the same stage as Vietnam in
economic development.100 Not surprisingly, this surrogate methodology
inherently involves many pitfalls. For instance, the DOC elected as
surrogate companies two Bangladeshi shrimp processing companies that
did not actually raise their own shrimp. 10 1 Replacing data from farming
industries with those from processing industries that do not engage in
farming activities seems highly unpersuasive. The dubious science
employed in this surrogate enterprise was further compounded by the
questionable "availability" of surrogate companies. A surrogate candidate
is sub-optimal in most cases due to the lack of a perfect match in the real
world. For example, the DOC relied on data from India with regard to
production factors where Bangladeshi values were "not available" or
the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other
"Non-Market Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 84 (1987).
96 Id.
97 In fact, the DOC itself acknowledged the imperfectness of the designation of non-
market economy by submitting that its evaluation "does not require that countries be judged
against a theoretical model or a perfectly competitive laissez-faire economy" and that it
nonetheless "must determine that the factors, taken together, indicate that reforms have
reached a threshold level such that the country can be considered to have a functioning
market economy." See Market Economy Memorandum, supra note 94 (emphasis added).
98 See McCain, supra note 8.
99 Cf Alford, supra note 95, at 84 (trenchantly arguing that "China became Paraguay").
100 See Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
Affirmative Preliminary Determination of Critical Circumstances and Postponement of Final
Determination: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68
C.F.R. 4986, 4990-95 (2003).
'0' Id. at 4992.
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"impracticable."' 2  Thus, Vietnam becomes India in such a case. This
highly unnatural, arbitrary process tends to seriously undermine the
credibility of the DOC's final determinations.
The profound executive discretion enshrined in antidumping
procedures reaches its climax in the final stage of duty rate calculation. In
the case of market-economies, individual dumping margins are
automatically assigned to exporters. °3 However, in the case of NMEs, each
exporter must pass a "separate rate" test to receive its own, individual
dumping margins. 0 4 Those exporters that do not pass this test receive the
"countrywide" dumping margin, which is normally higher than the separate
rates. 0 Accordingly, in the Vietnamese catfish case the DOC assigned to
eleven individual producer/exporters individual dumping margins ranging
from 36.84% to 52.90% on the grounds that they were qualified for the
application of separate rates.1°6 The countrywide rate for Vietnam was
63.88% and was applied to producer/exporters who failed either to respond
to the DOC's questionnaires or to pass the separate rate test. 
07
3. A Booster for Protectionism: The Byrd Amendment
In yet another bold protectionist move, the U.S. Congress in 2000
passed a statute that handsomely rewarded the petitioners in the
antidumping suits. The "United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000, °108 dubbed the "Byrd Amendment" after the
Act's patron, Senator Robert Byrd, requires the U.S. Customs Service to
distribute the antidumping duties it collects to certain antidumping
petitioners on an annual basis.0 9 This monetary reward grants an extra
boon to domestic producers above and beyond the protection achieved
through antidumping suits. Needless to say, this statute has resulted in
domestic producers filing several new antidumping suits that they would
not have launched without the additional incentive." 0 Interestingly, the
102 Id.
103 U.S. Department of Commerce, Import Administration, Antidumping Manual, Ch. 8,
at 90, (Jan. 22, 1997), available at http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/.
104 id.
105 Id.
106 Notice of Final Antidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
and Affirmative Critical Circumstances: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg. 37116, 37121 (June 23, 2003).
107 Id.
108 The United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment),
Pub. L. 106-387, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2000).
109 Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, 12 (Jan. 16, 2003), [hereinafter Byrd
Amendment, Appellate Body Report].
110 Kenneth J. Pierce & Matthew R. Nicely, Case Studies: Catfish and Shrimp
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Byrd Amendment operates in a manner that resembles class action suits;'11
it provides the "lure of big cash awards" as well as "attorney contingency
arrangements."'"12 The SSA, the main petitioner in the Vietnamese shrimp
anti-dumping suit, sent letters to domestic shrimpers stating that "you must
register to participate in any monetary benefits that may accrue through
duties levied on imported shrimp if the domestic industry prevails."
'"13
During the 2001-2003 period, total disbursements to petitioners under the
Byrd Amendment amounted to $0.8 billion."
14
In fact, the Byrd Amendment ran afoul of international trade rules.
More than ten WTO Members, including the EC, Canada, Japan, India and
Brazil, filed a collective suit against the United States over the statute
before the WTO panel. 15 In the course of adjudication, the United States
attempted to distinguish the case from the previous U.S.-1916 Act (2002)
case that featured a similar fact pattern. In its defense, the United States
argued that the CDSOA, unlike the 1916 Act which imposed civil actions
and criminal proceedings on alleged dumpers, did not violate Article 18.1
of the WTO Antidumping Agreement because the CDSOA is not the type
of "specific" action prohibited under Article 18.1 in order to prevent an
over-blown use of antidumping measures for protectionist purposes.1 6 The
Appellate Body (AB) rather summarily rejected this defense by finding that
dumping is, in fact, a constituent element of the CDSOA, at least by
implication." 7 Notwithstanding the AB's ruling, the United States has not
repealed the Byrd Amendment.' 8 Despite the recent WTO authorization to
retaliate against the U.S. for its non-compliance with WTO rules in this
matter,"19 Congress' continued support for the Byrd Amendment suggests
Antidumping Cases, Conference Paper presented at the NCIEC WTO Conference, at 1-5
(Georgetown University Law Center, Mar. 11, 2004).
111 Regarding certain negative aspects of class action suits, see e.g., Developments - The
Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2000); Janet Cooper Alexander,
Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlement in Securities Class Action, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497, 581-82 (1991).
112 Pierce & Nicely, supra note 110, at 5.
113 Id. at 5.
114 Id. at 4; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, The Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/addcvd/cont-dump/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2004).
115 Byrd Amendment, Appellate Body Report, supra note 109, 3-4.
116Id. 243.
117 Id. 244.
118 See Status Report by the United States (Addendum), United States - Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/16/Add.6, WT/DS234/24/Add.6,
(July 6, 2004).
119 WTO, Arbitrator Issues Awards on "Byrd Amendment, " Aug. 31, 2004, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news04_e/news04_e.htm.
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that it will not be repealed in the near future, 120 despite the Congressional
Budget Office's negative evaluation that the law leads to inefficient use of
allocation within the U.S. economy by subsidizing certain firms at the
expense of others and stimulating unnecessary litigations.1
21
C. The Judiciary
Although the Court plays a rather indirect role in this protectionist
enterprise vis-d-vis the other governmental branches, its practical
contribution to the protectionist mission, particularly in terms of
antidumping measures, is as significant as that of the Executive. Courts
have performed a minimal level of judicial review over antidumping
measures rendered by the DOC and the ITC in the spirit of the Chevron
doctrine.122 The Chevron doctrine (prong two) mandates that, except for
situations where the mandate of Congress is explicit and clear (prong one),
a reviewing court should respect professional decisions by an administrative
agency, such as the DOC, as long as such agency's decision is not arbitrary
or unreasonable. 123  Additionally, hearings conducted during the
antidumping investigation are often beyond the reach of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 124 Considering that the Executive is directly responsible for
conducting the analysis and handling the computations and other minutia
associated with administering and enforcing the antidumping statute, it
should be no surprise that a judicial carte blanche would be extended to
such "devilish details."'
125
The phenomenon of minimal judicial review on antidumping measures
is consistent in all levels of judicial scrutiny. The Court of International
Trade (CIT), a trial court reviewing final determinations by the DOC and
the ITC, in fact functions as an appellate tribunal and is "extremely
120 See Byrd-Brained, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 4, 2004, at 69; Dan Ikenson, "Byrdening"
Relations: U.S. Trade Policies Continue to Flout the Rules, Free Trade Bulletin No. 5 (Jan.
13, 2004), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-005.html (depicting trade
remedy laws, such as the Byrd Amendment, as the "sacred cow" of the U.S. trade policy).
12 1 Letter from Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to Congressman Bill Thomas:
Economic Analysis of the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, available at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cftn?index=5130&sequence=0 (last visited Nov. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter CBO Letter].
122 See Haldane Robert Mayer, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. UNrv. L. REv. 761, 762 (2003).
123 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
See Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and the Charming Betsy: Is There a Place
for the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and Countervailing
Determinations?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 230 (2003/2004).
124 Walton, supra note 5, at 486; 19 C.F.R. § 351.310(d)(2).
125 See generally LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 67.
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deferential.' ' 26 The CIT's standard of review carries less weight than the
evidence when it reviews the DOC's determinations. 127 Likewise, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit does not, at present, seem to be an ideal
appellate forum for foreign producers in the antidumping litigation. Apart
from its chronic shortage of judges, which is often redressed by means of
visiting district judges, 28 the relatively narrow scope of its jurisdiction,
which is limited to "complex and technical" determinations by the DOC,
129
tends to result in the extension of a broad range of deference to the DOC.
In fact, the Federal Circuit considers the DOC as the "master" of the
antidumping statute.' 30  The Federal Circuit endorsed the Chevron
deference in the antidumping case even regardless of any international trade
agreement, such as GATT. 131 To make matters worse, its current standard
of review, as demonstrated in its decision on trade remedies, is
inconsistent. 132  Finally, the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari to
antidumping cases appealed from the Federal Circuit, partly because "no
circuit split controversy exists.' 33
In sum, in the case of antidumping measures, courts cannot provide
recourse for antidumping victims on account of the structural factors
outlined above, including the great discretion bestowed on the Executive in
antidumping investigations and determinations. Reluctant to second-guess
the exercise of such discretion, the judiciary tends to enshrine the initial
protectionist impact rendered by the Executive.
126 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2000); Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 149 (1997);
Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 705 (1980). See also
Walton, supra note 5, at 489; James A. Toupin, The U.S. Court of International Trade and
the U.S. International Trade Commission After Ten Years - A Personal View, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 10, 25 (1991).
127 Walton, supra note 5, at 489-90; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750
F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
128 Mayer, supra note 122, at 762.
129 See Bemd G. Janzen, International Trade Decisions of the Federal Circuit: Three
Years of Rigorous Review, 52 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1027, 1130 (2003).
130 Id. at 1078; Daewoo Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Electrical, Tech., Salaried
& Mach. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See also Seastrum, supra note 123, at
230.
131 See Seastrum, supra note 123, at 237-38.
132 Herbert C. Shelley et al., The Standard of Review Applied by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Case, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1749, 1781-82 (1996).
133 Walton, supra note 5, at 490; Toupin, supra note 126, at 19.
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IV. THE DUAL CATASTROPHE OF PROTECTIONISM: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL
A. National (Federal) Catastrophe
It is not difficult to measure the level of damage that this seafood
protection causes to consumers and to the U.S. economy in general.
Considering that one out of every three seafood restaurants in the United
States serves catfish, the targeted protectionism mentioned above and
resultant price increase obviously hurts catfish importers, processors,
wholesalers, retailers and related employees, to say nothing of consumers,
who pay a sizable "protection tax," 134 for no other reason than to serve the
parochial interests of southern catfish farmers. 135 Similarly, almost nine6
percent of all domestic shrimp consumption is supplied by imports.
Shrimp imports have created about 100,000 jobs in the shrimp processing
sector and an additional $2 billion annually to retailers and restaurants in
the United States.1 37 To save one job in the domestic shrimp production
sector, twenty jobs in shrimp-consuming industries such as processing and
distribution may need to be sacrificed. 138 In sum, the United States cannot,
and should not, contravene the law of economic gravity that has converted
the shrimp, once a luxury item, into the most popular, yet affordable,
seafood in the country. 139 The prosperity brought by open trade policies is
now being jeopardized. 140
Further, gross protectionism of this sort can be interpreted as a form of
"constitutional failure"'141 in that it violates basic tenets on which the U.S.
Constitution is predicated: anti-parochialism and an integrated federal
marketplace. Local protectionism not only sacrifices the welfare of the
many for the narrow benefit of a few, but if left unchecked, it spreads its
pathogen more broadly and infects other parts of the whole. This disease
threatened nation building under the Articles of Confederation. Economic
balkanization was precipitated by mutually destructive tariff wars among
134 See Consumers for World Trade, Protectionism in America: Watch Your Wallet (Nov.
1, 2003), available at http://www.cwt.org/learn/CWT%20Protection%2OTax% 20Study.pdf.
135 McCain, supra note 8.
136 See Tran Dinh Thanh Lam, supra note 76.
137 id.
138 Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), Facts about the Shrimp
Dumping Case, available at http://www.citac.info/shrimp/about/factsheet.htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter CITAC, Facts].
139 Shrimp and Mischief, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2004; Vietnam Protests, supra note 27.
140 McCain, supra note 8.
14' ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 133
(1999) (quoting Jan Tumlir). See generally JAN TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES (1985).
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the thirteen Confederates that were in thrall to their respective local
interests.142 This sobering historical lesson corroborates the far-reaching
interpretation of the Commerce Clause143 articulated by James Madison and
Chief Justice John Marshall, as well as the ingenious invention of the
"Dormant Commerce Clause," which allowed the invalidation of
protectionist state taxes and regulations. 144
The antidumping mechanism provides a clear example of how
protectionism can be a constitutional failure. Although it is a federal rather
than a state initiative, antidumping protection can be as harmful as
conventional local protectionism as long as it serves and channels parochial
interests at the expense of the federal economy. Yet, apart from a direct
effect on protection tax, which has been discussed above, the antidumping
mechanism further distorts a federal market system by steering scant
domestic resources, such as labor and capital, "from higher-value to lower-
value uses."' 145 The recent Byrd Amendment has fueled such inefficient
resource allocation by feeding moribund domestic industries with the very
antidumping duties collected as a result of their own petitions. It has also
contributed to enormous transaction costs incurred by sparking a flurry of
lobbying and lawyering. 46 Some have argued that the Byrd Amendment
might even resurrect deceased industries which would resume production in
order to receive the disbursement. 147  To make matters worse, the
antidumping mechanism also encourages cartelization of certain products
because its persecution of low-priced imports generates the same effect as
price fixing between foreign and domestic producers. 48 Foreign producers
are forced to join this cartelization either by voluntarily raising their export
prices to a certain comfort price level comparable to domestic industries or
by involuntarily being subject to antidumping duties tantamount to alleged
dumping margins. Invariably, their eventual U.S. sale prices will either be
fixed or remedied. Such anti-trust phenomenon runs afoul of the U.S.
economic constitutionalism advocating free market and free competition.
Finally, all these results tend to be multiplied by a reasonably
speculated contagion effect of antidumping suits. Encouraged by the
Vietnamese catfish and shrimp sagas, other U.S. industries may wage their
own bets and seek their own protection from foreign competition through
142 See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (8th ed., 1996).
143 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1044-46 (3d ed., Vol. I.,
2000).
144 See id. at 1030. See also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991).
145 See CBO Letter, supra note 121.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization,
67 ANTITRUST L. J. 725 (2000).
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antidumping suits. The recent Byrd Amendment warrants such speculation.
Even if the antidumping statute is unobjectionable, arguendo, on
constitutional grounds, this type of administrative protection is ultimately
ineffective because it cannot completely block the inflow of competition
from multiple sources. Blocking Vietnamese shrimp cannot be translated
into protecting the southern shrimp farmers when shrimp from the Gulf of
Mexico and South Atlantic are filling the gap. 149 The recent surge in
Chinese catfish imports to the U.S. market lends added credibility to this
forecast. 50 In addition, U.S. domestic shrimpers also targeted shrimp
imports from trading partners other than Vietnam, such as Brazil, China,
Ecuador, India, and especially Thailand.' 51 Thailand is the chief provider of
both frozen and prepared shrimp products to the United States.' 2 If those
countries-which, unlike Vietnam, are all WTO Members-were to
challenge the U.S. antidumping measures against their shrimp exports
pursuant to the WTO dispute resolution procedure and win, the United
States would have to withdraw its antidumping measures unless it chose to
tolerate retaliation. Under this circumstance, the United States would also
have to treat Vietnam in the same way, due to its Most-Favored Nation
obligation under the bilateral trade agreement with Vietnam. This outcome
only strengthens the case against the antidumping regime.
B. International Catastrophe
The all-out protection against Vietnamese catfish and shrimp has cost
the United States dearly with respect to foreign policy, particularly with
Vietnam. The recent skirmishes over Vietnamese catfish and shrimp make
a mockery of U.S. diplomatic efforts toward normalization, ranging from
the detente to the signing of a bilateral trade agreement. At the same time,
the United States' protectionist actions have caused severe damage to their
reputation as an advocate of free trade. In the process, they have only
strengthened the claims of critics of American Exceptionalism.
While the catfish war may be unfamiliar to people in the United States,
it has been front-page news in Vietnam. 153 Catfish are crucial sources of
income not only for farmers in the Mekong Delta area, but also for people
employed in the processing and export sectors in the neighboring
provinces. 154  U.S. protectionism deprives Vietnam of a ladder to
149 See Tran Dinh Thanh Lam, supra note 76.
15o See Kobbeman, supra note 7, at 431.
151 Tran Dinh Thanh Lam, supra note 76.
152 David J. Harvey, Imports Provide Competition for Domestic Production,
AQUACULTURE OUTLOOK (USDA LDP-AQS-14), Oct. 10, 2004, at 7, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/so/view.asp?f=-livestock/ldp-aqs/2001/.
153 Harvesting Poverty, supra note 3.
154 Guttal, supra note 71; Fighting Dirty Over Catfish, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jul. 23,
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prosperity. While import restriction of catfish impoverishes a large number
of poor Mekong River catfish farmers, import restriction of shrimp is much
more serious, considering that shrimp is Vietnam's third largest export after
crude oil and textiles.
155
Yet, what may be most damaging to U.S. relations with Vietnam are
the latter's perceptions of a "hypocrisy" or "double standard" in the recent
U.S. trade policies targeting Vietnamese seafood exports. First, it was the
United States that initially spotlighted Vietnam's comparative advantage in
aquaculture and thus advised Vietnam to invest in it.' 56 Moreover, when
domestic anxieties brewed in Vietnam over potential negative effects that
the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement might bring, the United States
strongly urged Vietnam to overcome parochial protectionism and pursue
bold trade liberalization.1 57 In fact, many Vietnamese conservatives within
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leadership were originally
opposed to the trade deal with the United States for fear that social
instability, such as unemployment, could be caused by heightened
competition from abroad. 5 It was this hesitation that delayed the final
deal. 159 Hitting expanding Vietnamese industries with heavy antidumping
duties while "the ink was not yet dry on that agreement"' 60 would certainly
vindicate Vietnamese conservatives and frustrate proponents who believed
that the trade deal would "nudge Vietnam toward a more democratic society
by committing the government to enact market-oriented reforms.' 16' One
Vietnamese businessman remarked bitterly that, "our nation has a heavy
history, and we try to forget it, try something new based on a spirit of
cooperation and free trade, but now we are made to wonder whether you
wish us ill, as much in the present as you did in the past."'
162
This crisis in foreign relations transcends the realm of bilateral
relations. First, as discussed above, blatant protectionism like the current
catfish labeling scheme not only tarnishes U.S. credibility as a free trade
advocate but also weakens the force of U.S. arguments against similar
violations committed by other WTO Members, as was witnessed in the
United States' lukewarm engagement in attacking the E.U.'s sardines
2003, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/103673.html (reporting that about a half-
million Vietnamese are "living off the catfish trade").
155 Sengupta, supra note 16.
156 See Harvesting Poverty, supra note 3.
157 McCain, supra note 8.
158 See Manyin, Bilateral Trade Agreement, supra note 16, at 18-19.
159 Id.
160 McCain, supra note 8.
161 Id. at 7.
162 See Harvesting Poverty, supra note 3 (quoting Nguyen Huu Dung, the General
Secretary of the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters).
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labeling scheme which mirrored the catfish labeling scheme. 163 Second, the
United States' continuing reliance on antidumping measures is highly
communicable and tends to encourage reciprocal or defensive reactions
from other trading partners, which may be termed a negative learning
effect. 164 What if China follows the footsteps of the United States and
misuses, overuses or abuses antidumping measures to address the
"cushioning" concerns it is now facing in connection with WTO accession?
The ghost of the suicidal pre-war era mercantilist race still haunts the global
trading community.
Third, the aforementioned hypocrisy or double standard eclipses the
constructive message that free trade carries. Instead, people in developing
countries receive the following destructive message reminiscent of
imperialism or colonialism: you may serve as an export market for our
domestic products but not vice versa. In particular, the United States' trade
policies toward NMEs like Vietnam are highly contradictory. If the United
States continues to penalize exports from NMEs by imposing stricter
antidumping conditions, it will be tantamount to saying that such nations
must suffer until they become market economies, which will make it all the
more difficult for them to achieve that status. Moreover, the U.S. double-
standard policy may also send a negative massage to would-be WTO
Members, such as Russia, 165 who are now negotiating their accessions with
the United States and the WTO. In particular, widespread frustrations and
disappointments over the U.S. protectionist attacks launched immediately
after the signing of the U.S.-Vietnam BTA may be used as ammunition by
domestic opponents who suspects that power, not rules, would still prevail
within the WTO. 166 This negative empirical confirmation also tends to chip
away at positions held by proponents who preach long-term benefits which
the WTO membership may bring to Russia.167 This dark scenario becomes
darker considering the fact that the Russian steel is now subject to, and
continues to be vulnerable to, U.S. antidumping measures.'
68
Finally, Hanoi's indignation over the recent trade skirmishes with the
163 See supra § II.A.
164 See Inge Nora Neufeld, Antidumping and Countervailing Procedures - Use or
Abuse?: Implications for Developing Countries iii (2001); Policy Issues in International
Trade and Commodities Study Series No. 9, UNCTAD/ITCDTAB/10, at 3-4.
165 See generally WTO Accessions: Russian Federation, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/acce/alrussie e.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2004).
166 Russia Knocking on the WTO Door, PRAVDA, May 18, 2004, available at
http://newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/05/18/53974.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2004).
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CDSOA - AMOUNT AVAILABLE
FOR DISBURSEMENT BY CASE AND CLAIMANT 104 (Case: A-821-809 Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel
Flat Products / Russia), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/addcvd/
cont-dump/cdsoa_03/cdsoa03_section 1.ctt/cdsoa03section 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2004).
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United States tends to make the U.S. foreign affairs cost in this case be far
higher when this China factor is viewed against a broader backdrop.
Vietnam has managed its delicate geo-political situation by balancing its
foreign relations with China and the United States. By normalizing its
relations with the United States, Vietnam had to embrace an anxious China,
which had discouraged Hanoi from striking a trade deal with Washington
before China did in 1999.169 Yet, recent developments tend to distance
Vietnam from the United States and steer it closer to China. Notably, China
has taken advantage of the "disillusionment" of some Asian economies
about the "pace and tone" of the Clinton Administration's free trade
policies in enhancing its influence in Asia,170 which has contributed to the
recent establishment of a new coalition of the "ASEAN plus 3 (China,
Korea, and Japan)."' l71 In this vein, Kavi Chongkittavorn aptly commented
that, "China hasn't replaced the U.S. But it's eating away at America's
influence. This is going to keep happening unless Washington changes its
ways.'
172
V. REMEDYING THE CATASTROPHE: FIDELITY TO OPENNESS
A. Openness in the National Sphere
"All politics is local,"' 173 and the politics associated with international
trade are no exception. As Robert Putnam aptly described in his "two-level
games" model, 17 a subtle interface between "international commitment"
and "domestic endorsement" tends to control the final outcome of any
foreign policy. The problem, as public choice scholars argue, 175 lies in the
fact that domestic endorsement is often hijacked and usurped by a narrow
scope of powerful, well-orchestrated lobbying groups with little input from
the broader public. Accordingly, in molding public policies, the welfare of
a few is often prioritized over the welfare of the many. In fact, this strong
local bias toward protectionism is built in structurally, at least in trade
169 See Manyin, Bilateral Trade Agreement, supra note 16, at 19.
170 Carlyle A. Thayer, ASEAN Ten Plus Three: An Evolving East Asian Community?, 2
COMP. CONNECTIONS: AN E-JOURNAL ON E. ASIAN BILATERAL REL. 52 (2001),
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/004Q.pdf.
171 See generally U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, and South
Korea), available at http://www.us-asean.org/ASEANOverview/asean+3.asp (last visited
Nov. 25, 2004).
172 Thayer, supra note 170.
173 See generally TIP O'NEILL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME
(1994).
174 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
175 See Felkins, supra note 1; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 1.
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policies. Certain arcane trade statutes still wield a powerful "institutional
heritage" which has been established by the Congress and is captured, not
surprisingly, by fragmented local constituencies that routinely engage in
costly and wasteful "horse-trading." 176  Occasionally, the Executive
attempts to overcome this institutional heritage without success.
77
Ultimately, the competition between international commitment and
domestic endorsement often results in the schizophrenic and unstable co-
existence of free trade and local protectionism. 
178
The best way to redress this constitutional failure is to return to a
classical vehicle of democracy: open debates for public awareness.
Certainly, initial challenges to protectionism will be led primarily by
interested constituencies. In a move to balance the political ledger, the
"Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC)" joined the
"American Seafood Distributors Association (ASDA)" to create the
"Shrimp Task Force." 179 This alliance of grocers, restaurants, processors,
distributors and other businesses organizations180 aims to raise awareness of
hard facts so that policymakers, media, and the public will be better
informed regarding the devastating effects of parochial protectionism. As
Anne Krueger has observed, "if citizens could easily identify and directly
vote on the magnitudes of gains and losses from protection," the U.S. trade
policies would be different from what they are now. 8 1  If properly
channeled toward local representatives, a well-informed vox populi can
thwart protectionist trade policies. Recently, thirteen Members of Congress
wrote to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans to wam against the
protectionist abuse of discretion exercised by the DOC in the recent
antidumping cases on the shrimp imports, emphasizing that the import
176 See JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 184-85
(1993); PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND US TRADE POLICY 130-32 (1993).
177 Id. at 236. For instance, the 1988 amendment of Section 301 severely constrained the
Administration by establishing "mandatory" retaliation as well as making procedures
stricter. Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation:
Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 244-
48 (1996). See also Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good
and Evil, in AGGREssIvE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 118 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (contending that the
Executive was "handcuffed" by tighter rules created by these amendments of Section 301);
Julia C. Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Suggested Strategies for
Foreign Response, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 501, 502 (1989) (portraying the 1988
amendment of Section 301 as a move "from a diplomatic, flexible means of solving market
access problems to a more rigid, procedural trade remedy statute.").
178 ANNE 0. KRUEGER, AMERICAN TRADE POL'Y: A TRAGEDY IN THE MAKING 30 (1995).
179 CITAC, supra note 138.
180 Shrimp Task Force, Which Companies Are Members of the Task Force?, at
http://www.citac.info/shrimp/about/membership.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
181 KRUEGER, supra note 178, at 3.
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restrictions would threaten thousands of American jobs in derivative
industries connected to shrimp imports.182 If members of the U.S. public
were to adopt a more proactive stance against parochial protectionism along
these lines, pursuit of the general welfare would stand a much better chance
of prevailing over local politics.
Furthermore, certain policies could be introduced to facilitate this
democratic process in and out of the government structure. First of all,
antidumping statutes may be amended to require the DOC to conduct a
"mandatory inter-agency consultation" before the imposition of final
antidumping duties. Unlike the DOC, which is vulnerable to capture by
domestic producers, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) tend to advocate the general values of market
competition and consumer welfare. The former FTC Chairman Daniel
Oliver, after highlighting the devastating effects of protectionism to
consumers and to competition itself,183 has stated that the FTC's role in
international trade is to speak for consumers and the competitive process.'
84
In this context, if either the FTC or the DOJ were given a role in the
antidumping procedure, it could effectively counteract the protectionist bias
embedded in the structure and operation of the antidumping statute.
In a similar vein, the antidumping statute should be amended to
include a "public interest clause," as is required in certain other
jurisdictions. 85  This clause would function as a safety valve to deter
situations in which the interests of a small group of producers are allowed
to prevail over the general welfare of consumers and the U.S economy as a
whole. Furthermore, introducing a mandatory public hearing, which is
required in the case of safeguard measures, 86 prior to any final antidumping
determination by the DOC would secure an effective opportunity for public
attention and intervention. 87 This procedural innovation would constitute a
182 Letter from Pete Sessions et al., United States Congress, to Donald Evans, Secretary
of Commerce (May 7, 2004).
183 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Chairman Oliver Says Protectionism
is Special Interest Legislation (May 17, 1988), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/
F88/oliveraiac.txt (analogizing protectionism as an effective cartel arrangement enforced by
the government and highlighting that the cost of protectionism fall disproportionately upon
low income workers).
184 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Trade Commission's Role
in International Trade is to Protect Consumers through Competition, at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/predawn/F86/fordham.htm (Oct. 16, 1986).
185 See generally Marc Wellhausen, The Community Interest Test in Antidumping
Proceedings of the European Union, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1027 (2001).
186 See Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The United States - Japan Semiconductor Accord of 1986:
The Shortcomings of High-Tech Protection, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 179, 207 (1989); 19
U.S.C.A. § 2151(e) ("In preparing its advice to the President under this section, the
Commission shall, after reasonable notice, hold public hearings." (emphasis added)).
187 Such mandatory public hearing within the DOC tends to provide a fertile ground for
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great improvement over the current hearing system within the DOC, which
is held mainly to give interested parties a chance to comment on case briefs
or on previous comments submitted to the antidumping authority by other
interested parties. 88
B. Openness in the International Sphere
In the arena of international commerce, a great many options,
especially non-entropic options, are available to those who are willing to
approach the problem with creativity and an open mind. First, the
moribund Southern seafood farmers might consider investing in the
Vietnamese catfish industries, which continue to prosper in the face of
protectionist attacks. 189 If the natural endowments of the Mekong Delta
were enhanced by Southern capital, greater wealth could be created on both
sides. The Vietnamese catfish and shrimp produced under such a foreign
direct investment (FDI) scheme would even find lucrative markets outside
the United States through exports. Although the catfish and shrimp would
be produced in Vietnam, Southern investors would be handsomely
compensated.
From a different standpoint, workers from Vietnam or other
developing countries could temporarily migrate to the South in order to
provide cheap labor, which would boost the price competitiveness of
Southern seafood. From an economic perspective, free movement of labor
shares the same premise--efficiency-with the free movement of other
factors of production, such as capital.1 90 Adherence to this basic economic
principle would serve the mutual benefit of home and recipient countries in
the form of remittance of wages and lower labor costs, respectively.
191
the consideration of the "public interest" in the final imposition of antidumping duties. See
Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 67, at 191-93.
"88 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(c) (1930).
189 This possibility was discussed in a conference held at Harvard Law School in 2003.
Karl Klare & Dan Danielsen, Case Study: International Regimes and Local Politics: Labor,
Catfish & Trade, presented at Harvard Law School (Apr. 13, 2003).
190 Considering the existence of large wage differentials on a global scale, mounting
migration pressures seem quite natural. See PAUL COLLIER & DAVID DOLLAR,
GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY: BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE WORLD ECONOMY 44-45
(2002) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY]. See also OECD Analysis
Shows Trends Reflecting Economic Opportunities, UN WIRE, at http://www.unwire.org/
UNWire/20020103/22816_story.asp (Jan. 3, 2002).
191 According to a World Bank report, seven million legal as well as three million
undocumented Mexican immigrant laborers contributed to the United States' sustained
growth with low inflation in the 1990's. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra
note 190, at 12. See also Dani Rodrik, Globalization for Whom, HARVARD MAGAZINE, Jul. -
Aug. 2002, at 31 (observing that "even a small relaxation" of restrictive rules on cross-
border labor movement will result in huge gains both for the world economy and for poor
countries in particular); Jean-Pierre Garson, Zero Immigration is Pure Fancy, 225 OECD
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Unfortunately, immigration often causes negative socio-political
consequences, including the displacement of domestic workers, which
make it politically controversial notwithstanding the fact that it would
enhance the overall welfare of the recipient countries.
Despite the socio-political impact of the free movement of labor, the
Uruguay Round attempted to address free movement of persons via the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), under the title of
"movement of natural persons. '192 Yet, the political stakes, particularly in
developed countries, did not allow much room for negotiation. 193 Although
those developing countries with abundant cheap labor forces advocated a
liberal scope for the movement of natural persons, they were unable to
overcome the unified opposition of developed countries, which feared an
influx of migrant workers. The end result was significantly restricted
coverage of this issue under the GATS, which currently concerns only
white-collar professionals. 1
94
In sum, current U.S. immigration policies leave very little room for the
possibility of guest workers from Vietnam. Nevertheless, this proposal will
remain relevant as long as business interests pursue economic incentives at
the domestic level and as long as poor countries continue pushing for a
more liberal policy at the international level.
VI. CONCLUSION: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
This Article, through the prism of Vietnamese seafood trade disputes,
has explored the causes and effects of parochial protectionism in the United
States, and suggested a number of options for overcoming such problems.
Stated broadly, the conclusion is that the United States should exercise real
leadership in the area of free trade instead of resorting to self-defeating and
hypocritical exceptionalism.
"American-style" politics, 195 which have recently been revealed in the
series of attacks against the Vietnamese seafood exports, provide yet
OBSERVER 27-28 (2001).
192 WTO Agreement, supra note 13, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1
B, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement. See
also Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT - WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421, 492-93
(1998).
193 This also explains why immigration is highly restricted in general by OECD
countries. GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND POVERTY, supra note 190, at 11.
194 See, e.g., The United States of America - Schedule of Specific Commitments,
GATS/SC/90 (Apr. 15, 1994) (in particular, "Horizontal Commitments," item 4), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/serv-commitments-e.htm (last visited Nov.
26, 2004). This trend, which favors an immigration of well-educated, professional people
from the developing countries, is called a "brain drain." GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND
POVERTY, supra note 190, at 79.
195 Becker, supra note 6 (quoting Frederick Z. Brown).
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another empirical confirmation on a broader theme of "American
Exceptionalism"'' 96 in trade policy, along with the recent "Steel Initiative"
197 and the gigantic $180 billion "Farm Bill,"'198 which was signed in 2002
to lavishly subsidize domestic farmers for years to come. These blatant
deviations from trade rules, which may collectively be interpreted as "de-
multilateralization," tend to ridicule and undermine the integrity of the
multilateral trading system. While international trade law may
metaphorically be portrayed as the ropes that fasten vulnerable Odysseus to
the mast of multilateralism against the tempting Sirens of protectionism,'
99
only the American Odysseus might freely untie its ropes and join the Sirens
whenever it feels inclined to. No matter what this Exceptionalism may be
attributable to, be it the U.S. governance structure 20 or its "institutional
heritage,, 20 1 it is obviously damaging both to the United States and to the
rest of the world. Although the United States undeniably enjoys
unparalleled power in the contemporary world, it cannot afford to abuse its
exceptional power when taking into account the enormous reputation cost202
196 Regarding a more general theme of American Exceptionalism, see SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996); DEBORAH L.
MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998).
197 Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President Regarding a Multilateral
Initiative on Steel, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20O1/06/20010605-4.html
(June 5, 2001).
198 Press Release, The White House, President Signs Farm Bill, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020513-2.html (May 13, 2002) (last
visited on Nov. 26, 2004).
199 See Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB?: The Future Design of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1309-36 (1971) (discussing the policy
of "lashing oneself to the mast").
200 See ROBERT L. PAARLBERG, LEADERSHIP ABROAD BEGINS AT HOME: US FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 32-53 (1995) (introducing a list of seven "enduring
and distinctive" features of the U.S. political system that have undermined its external
leadership: "divided government," "congressional power over trade," "disunity and
discontinuity in the executive," "transparency of policymaking," "legalism in
policymaking," "federalism," and "an insular popular culture"). See also STEPHEN D. COHEN
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, LAWS AND
ISSUES 105-08 (1996) (highlighting the "extraordinary degree" of decentralization in the U.S.
government); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 28
(2d ed. 1996) (regarding the "web of authority [Framers] created, from fear of too much
government"); RAYMOND VERNON ET AL., IRON TRIANGLES AND REVOLVING DOORS: CASES
IN U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 4 (1991) (viewing decentralization as a defining
feature of the U.S. foreign trade policy).
201 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 176, at 184-85 (1993) (describing protectionism as an
embedded "institutional heritage," which creates unpredictable outcomes on specific
occasions).
202 Cf. Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retaliation:
Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233, 286
(1996); William P. Alford, Taiwan and the GA TT Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan:
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and the loss of so-called "soft power.
20 3
To overcome Exceptionalism, the United States needs to play a greater
leadership role in the world by re-defining its narrow national interest to
accommodate a much broader range of global interests,20 4 including those
of Vietnamese catfish and shrimp exporters. The "porousness" of the U.S.
democracy20 5 has great potential to facilitate more open and candid
deliberation and debate on U.S. trade policies. Greater openness in the
domestic trade policy-making process would tend to produce a more
balanced and coherent position, which would be more open to and
accommodative of the multilateral trading system and the principle of free
trade. The reduction of protectionism by means of these constructive
innovations would constitute a dual success of domestic and foreign policy.
Only under such circumstances will the United States be able to fulfill its
proper leadership role in the world. Such leadership will truly be
exceptional.
A GATT-Fly's View, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 97, 98-99 (1992) (warning that such
exceptionalism might be translated into economic imperialism).
203 JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 162 (2002).
204 Id. at 138.
205 Stephen D. Krasner, Power and Constraint, 1 CHI. J. INT'l L. 231, 236 (2000).
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